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The Subject and Wonder 
Aldo Gargani 
The tree can become a burning flame, 
Man a speaking flame. 
Novalis, Fragments 
At his best, the poet can hope to attain 
two things: to represent, represent his 
times, that is, or else to present 
something whose time has not yet 
come. 
I. Bachman, Fragen und Scheinfragen 
Problems and critical intellectual attitudes spring from wonder 
and astonishment in the face of what surrounds us. But this "us" 
neither is nor ought to be clear: at most it is probably characterized 
contextually as that which experiences wonder. Wonder is not like 
curiosity about particular facts, such as how many examples of an 
old Dutch stamp survive, or how many particles make up the 
nucleus of a hydrogen atom. The problem is that there exists a 
whole cluster of expressions which have used (sometimes in banal, 
[Translated from the Italian by Joan Esposito] 
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unrealistic, or unintelligible ways) the concept of the "lived" in 
connection with "immediacy," "direct apprehension," or "em-
pathy with persons and life-situations." This was a radical and 
courageous enterprise, motivated by the desire to transcend the 
literal versions and norms of professional, institutionalized, official 
culture. Nevertheless, the concept of the "lived" has failed to 
extricate itself from those foundational epistemological presuppo-
sitions of the culture it was to surpass, for it presupposes a found-
ing, centered subject, albeit one who wanted to look elsewhere for 
the fulfillment of abilities repressed or ignored by the official cul-
ture. Often, then, the "lived" has appeared as but one fragment of 
a centered structure-the subject, the "I" -other components of 
which have attracted more attention from hard disciplines such as 
neurophysiology and logic . In other words, I think that the "lived" 
has been regarded as just one facet of an "I," a subject about which 
we have pretended to know too much . In fact, it is precisely this 
pretending to know too much, an attitude hidden in every nook 
and cranny of Western culture, which accounts for the above 
characteristics which have attended the notion of the "lived ." 
Examined closely, the attitudes of knowing too much or assuming 
too much (even if implicit and involuntary) are not really forms of 
knowledge or cognition, but rather networks of classifications, 
categorically divided, which determine how problems are concep-
tualized, or how intellectual disciplines and attitudes are defined. 
Foundational epistemology and universal languages grounded in 
either physiology or transcendental structures are not really 
knowledge of anything in particular, but are categories and clas-
sifications which pay lip service to current science out of a need for 
security or a nostalgia for childhood lullabies . Very often a 
philosophical discussion presents itself as a conflict between dif-
ferent tendencies which would lead to different types of classifica-
tion. Often, too, in an attempt to achieve security, a third category 
is coined which reconciles two others previously considered an-
tithetical. The resulting discussion looks like a professional 
philosophical argument between opposing parties, but the appar-
ent conflict is often an illusion, for it is really the categories that are 
opposed to each other, not the philosophers. It's not so much a 
struggle as a difference in positions which gets mistaken for a 
discussion. It's as if there were a battle without a battlefield: the 
conflict is up in the clouds, not here. 
Naturally, both the existence of the conflict and its degree of 
reality depend on the necessity of the problem, which in turn 
depends solely on how much effort one wishes to expend on it, on 
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the strength of one's commitment to re-explore literal, traditionally 
established and protected norms and texts with atypical and as yet 
unestablished approaches and values. What I want to say is that 
problems have become more rewarding than solutions. Manipulat-
ing normative, literal philosophical categories such as realism, 
conventionalism, physicalism, transcendentalism, and their ilk no 
longer seems meaningful; it has become more like setting the table 
than dining. 
The thing that imprisons humans and saps their strength, 
perhaps even makes them tremendously unhappy, is their 
groundless presupposition that they know so much. Isn't it about 
time we replaced this with an admission of ignorance? I'm not just 
talking about the obvious, easy cases-strong theories like realism, 
physicalism, doctrines of transcendentals. I want to discuss dif-
ficult cases which are believed to recognize the crucial importance 
of the disquieting, the problematic, the desperate: everything 
which seems to have given free rein to life as lived- with its 
personal reactions, its yearnings, its paradoxes-poised over the 
abyss. Suppose we take Kafka's work, with its desperate search for 
justice, meaning, explanation. How much critical literature is 
ready to interpret him as saying that these goals are impossible 
ones, that they represent unanswerable questions! Wasn't it Kafka 
himself who said, in his Oktavhefte, that his search had taken him 
beyond life and humanity? He wrote : "At first I was astonished 
that my questions hadn't been answered; now I wonder how I 
could ever have asked them." The questions having been impossi-
ble ones, they shouldn't have been asked. Doesn't Wittgenstein 
say the same thing: that often our questions are devoid of sense? 
Today it's common to assume that merely admitting that certain 
questions cannot be asked implies that we know the limits of 
possible questions. Isn't the point of Kafka's parable of the guar-
dian and the peasant before the gate of the law (Var dem Gesetz) that 
it is necessary to cross over this threshold, and enter into life and 
justice, rather than ask so many questions; that in reality it's not the 
guardians who constitute the fundamental obstacle, but rather our 
questions? According to Wittgenstein, we should stay within the 
limits of our ordinary language and not ask meaningless questions; 
Kafka seems to say that we should participate in life and justice 
instead of asking questions, as if up to now we weren't right here, 
where we are, immersed in our ordinary language, our life, our 
observance, such as it is, of laws and justice. Place yourself in your 
own form of life (Lebensform), recommends Wittgenstein, who, in 
spite of the fact that this is not all nor even the best thing he says, 
DIFFERENT/A 26 
claims that if you are not in tune with your particular form of life, the 
responsibility is squarely yours. Participate in forms of life and 
justice; don't get sidetracked asking impossible or meaningless 
questions. But how could we even make a claim like this unless we 
had a certain reserve stock of intellectual certitude? Isn't the very 
claim that some things are nonsense a certitude; that is, isn't it 
already too large a claim? But perhaps this type of disquieting 
intellectual spasm, this paradox, just ends up substituting a new 
kind of norm for that which it opposes. I ask, is it really possible to 
delve into some intellectual hinterland to find a response to all the 
doubts, questions, paradoxes formulated by our past culture? In 
spite of their gravity, these problems and paradoxes seem rooted in 
a field which contains the seeds of their solutions. But this is not 
necessarily true. Doesn't the very notion of a paradox imply the 
need for a new language? Because of this, we are disposed to reject 
reconstructions or solutions which remain within the terms of the 
problem, accepting the assumption that problems arise along with 
the germ of their solutions. And it is precisely this refusal which 
generates wonder-the non-assumption of excessive knowledge. 
In The Man Without Qualities, Ulrich, after having lost the signifi-
cance of what we ordinarily call "spirit" or "intelligence," despairs 
of ever finding it; nevertheless, he continues to feel its attraction, 
just as one might continue throughout one's life to love a con-
stantly unfaithful woman, never loving her any less for her be-
trayal. We should take his paradox seriously: he encounters things 
in a new way, since "when one- loves, everything is love, even 
when it is pain and horror." To the man without qualities, things 
don't seem made of wood or stone, but rather of a grand, delicate 
immorality which transforms itself into a profound moral emotion 
the moment it comes in contact with him. 1 What are we to make of 
this and simila ~· paradoxes, problems, and contradictions? Up to 
now the culture has domesticated them, relegating them to the 
pre-wonder state which their very existence had already tran-
scended. Even wonder itself has usually been explained away, its 
most heady and disturbing moments reduced to the already famil-
iar. The tactic has usually been to claim that a particular person had 
a particular experience in a particular place which caused his feel-
ing of perplexity or disquiet. But this move just forgets all the 
distinctions that have been made between the natural and the 
human sciences, between positivism, empiricism, and reduc-
tivism, on the one hand, and hermeneutics on the other. In the face 
of the riskiest, most terrifying events or mental experiences, the 
same old nomological-deductive methods of the natural sciences 
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have been reductively employed. This is what takes place every 
time a lived experience, manifestation, or symbolic form of wonder 
gets explained away: civilization, the crisis of language, the man 
without qualities' grand immorality of things which changes into a 
profound moral emotion, even Kafka's himself, or his peasant 
before the threshold of the law, blocked by his own questions from 
doing what he should: crossing it. The same applies to the tactic of 
claiming that we are stuck with a whole series of improperly 
formulated problems because we fail to respect the limits of ordi-
nary language. All these explanations follow the same pattern: we 
ape the physical sciences with their subsumption of phenomena 
under covering laws every time we assume that problems, 
paradoxes, wonder itself can be explained away using the old 
language in which they were formulated. To illustrate, take a film 
plot: a happily married man pretends, with his wife's knowledge, 
that he is having an affair. He disguises himself and forces a doctor 
who has been blackmailing him to break into the safe at the firm 
where he himself works. He convinces the police that the doctor 
did it, but at the end, having been abandoned by the wife he used 
and abused, gives the money to the police, knowing that he's 
finished anyway, and thus becomes a suspect. But a plot like this 
admits of many interpretations. We might say that the thirst for 
money destroys the sanctity of love, even if motivated by love. Or 
perhaps that the guilty are always caught, or that love is stronger 
than lust for money and pr :,sessions, compelling the criminal to 
give himself up at the end. These are among our pat interpreta-
tions. So why, then, was the film made if we already knew what it 
was going to say? Certainly trite films are made deliberately, but 
this isn't always the case. One can always look for something new; 
even the most apparently banal or mediocre films might contain 
something important or significant. In this one, for example, we 
might say that the meaning of the whole complicated intrigue-a 
man, seemingly victimized, in reality exploits another man under 
threat, becomes his own safecracker, but then, at the end, undoes 
the whole thing, ending up with neither love nor money-is really 
that a man's evil belongs to him, is born, grows, and dies with him. 
Not in the sense that everyone is the victim of his own errors, but 
that each is his own fatal, inevitable error with which he must live. 
Every violation of the other is thus a violation of self, so that the 
protagonist never succeeds in getting outside of himself. Instead, 
the end of the tale brings him back to his origin, the origin of a self 
that is the cause of its evil, breaking, as it were, into the safe of his 
inner self. This is what he realizes at the end. The protagonist's 
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wonder, his final paradox, might be that he has never really hurt 
anyone but himself; in fact, that he has never even really encoun-
tered the other, remaining imprisoned within himself. It might even 
be significant that on the very day that the guilty one decides to 
become the suspect, the police commissioner decides to retire and 
cultivate his begonias, leaving the criminal to go his own way, 
unpunished, but watching from his high office window, as if his 
eye were following the suspect through the streets. Perhaps the 
commissioner has discovered that the man walking away has 
sinned against himself alone, and that there is thus no point in 
interfering. But the wonder belongs above all to the criminal him-
self, who at the end discovers something he had never even sus-
pected during his past life. Is he then back where he began, as if he 
hadn't stolen anything? After all, he has neither the money nor the 
woman he loved. I would say not . The film ends exactly where it 
should: at the moment when the protagonist is rooted in the 
wonder which has suspended his world. 
Wonder (stupore) has the function of setting things in motion . 
But if we tie it to the lived (vissuto) assuming that the latter is a 
private and inaccessible entity (an assumption that has provoked 
justified attacks from analytic philosophers), wonder appears as 
the opposite of what it really is. Instead, wonder is the state in 
which one recognizes that one is not what one is or thought oneself 
to be. Wonder is the event that produces a dissociation of the 
person (persona), if the latter is understood as that bearer of con-
sciousness who is usually manifested in various institutionalized 
social or familial roles, or is invested with a known form of con-
sciousness or self. The wonderer becomes something else as the 
self splits; there is a feeling of being the source of one's own 
presence in life, not of being an inaccessible and private entity. 
Thus wonder is a structurally ambiguous condition: it destroys our 
habitual faith in the person to which we ordinarily entrust our-
selves, stirring up, as a by-product, a sense of guilt. At the same 
time, however, it seems to restore our ties with others, our lines of 
communication with external reality. We regain our closeness and 
love for this latter, as if we had always loved it and longed for it, 
even unknowingly. Wonder stirs up what we call consciousness by 
making it oscillate between the literal person it ordinarily is and 
that whole other overarching circle of our being which we discover 
and which we can never know exhaustively . Wonder stirs to action 
because it causes a wavering between the sense of guilt at having to 
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abandon, at least partially, the ordinary, limited person, and a 
sense of being open to a harmony with outer experience and the 
places where we live, which, though never conclusive, is expan-
sive, fortuitous, a gift. In the act of this transition, this wavering 
between the person and the self, the scenes of our lives assume the 
appearance of a grand immorality of things. But the feeling of 
separation that we can blame on the concentration and restriction 
of the person is in its own right the source of a different type of guilt 
feeling-the feeling of being just an isolated self and thus able to 
avoid love, joy, hope, and suffering. Thus every one of these 
instances is two-sided. The immorality of things becomes a pro-
found moral emotion because it returns us to a reality we had 
formerly betrayed, but the price is a new betrayal of the I as a 
person, that official, institutionalized figure with whom we have 
lived for so long, if nothing more. This accounts for the resistances, 
the tragedy which attends the transfiguration of a person. The 
encounter with reality is the perception of a grand immorality 
because, as we have seen, when one loves, all is love, even if it is 
pain and horror. This grand immorality of things and its disquiet-
ing effects depend only superficially on a characteristic of im-
mediate sensation. There is really a judgment at issue: to confront 
or accept the grand immorality is tantamount to judging that things 
just happen. The "immorality" does not reside in the individual: 
this way of looking at it is linked to the traditional, rationalistic 
notion of a founding, centered subject, whose chief characteristic is 
that nobody is closer to his I than he himself. But we have seen that 
the mind is anything but closed in on itself, because it is always 
immersed in circumstances, displaced in a network of accidents, 
casual possibilities, and chance. The source, the scenario of the 
immorality is offered by reality itself, with its generous and cynical 
gift of circumstances and events that just happen. The problem for 
the person or the more restricted I is how to come to recognize this. 
That things just happen is a tough idea to swallow for a mind 
habituated by a long intellectual tradition to regard itself as an 
ethical subject destined to redeem the world. 
Humans are involved in this effort, and it is indeed both 
difficult and demanding. We can see this demonstrated in art, 
cinema, and literature, all of which represent ideal types who 
struggle with this task in their imaginary surroundings in a manner 
much more coherent than is possible for real humans. Nothing is 
truer than the commonplace that some things happen only in 
films, for it is on them that we unleash our irrepressible demand for 
a coherent paradigm, an exemplary sketch of that truth which 
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ordinary mortals cannot bear. Just as Mach observed that humans, 
unlike animals, kill off scientific hypotheses instead of themselves, 
so one might say that humans make screen characters suffer and 
die instead of struggling themselves. Hence a certain cowardice 
characterizes the spectator as such and the culture in general. 
Contrary to what is generally believed, there is no ethical obliga-
tion greater than that which is produced in dealing with the mate-
rials and circumstances of risk, of loss, of failure. Nothing is less 
true than that certain things happen only in films, for they happen 
to some extent every day in real life. But out of inertia, melancholy, 
and exhaustion grows a resistance to recognizing that happening 
right before our eyes are those very things which we exorcised 
from real life, relegating them to the realm of impersonal, symbolic 
representations, refusing to take responsibility for them. 
In order to make this line of thought more concrete, it is 
necessary to add an unavoidable theoretical consideration as well 
as some more examples. The first is that the world as it is given, and 
however it might be given, does not seem to present the opportun-
ity for that individualization of the self to which wonder and 
astonishment (meraviglia) incite us. Doesn't that mean that we can 
exist, live, and attain security only with a new language? I mean 
that language which originates precisely in the separation from the 
world which persists, remains, and is not displaced by 
astonishment-that world which remains and persists in its literal-
ness, which is, as it were, sanctioned by forms of our in-
stitutionalized language . We need a new language in order to reach 
that meaning and motivation that are inacessible via the literalness 
of ordinary phrases. Illustrating an unsuccessful instance of com-
munication, Ingeborg Bachman in Malina exposes the failure of her 
partner Ivan's assurances (assicurazione). Ivan explains to her that 
"we' re insured against everything" ( er wird mir wieder erkliiren, dass 
wir gegen alles versichert sind), 2 "like cars, against earthquakes, 
hurricanes, thefts, accidents, hailstorms, and all the rest." But 
I-and here I don't say it's either one of the characters or Bachman 
herself who speaks-but I find myself reassured (assicurato) by a 
sentence and not by anything else (aber ich bin versichert in einem Satz 
und in sonst nichts). 3 And right away she adds: "the world holds no 
assurance for me" (Die Welt kennt keine Versicherung fur mich). It's 
not the case that we're dealing here with a simple contrast between 
a substantial, fleshly world whose absence causes insecurity, and 
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the inadequacy of a simple proposition which is necessarily incap-
able of replacing it. Sentences and propositions belong to this world of 
facts (di quel mondo data) which gives itself in a static, immovable 
literalness. The source of the I's dissatisfaction is neither a sentence 
nor the absence of a reassuring world, but rather the whole circuit 
of representation: both the world and the sentence which represents it 
in all its literalness. In fact, in another passage, Bachman says: 
I never stop hoping, praying, believing that I've heard a 
sentence-one not born of exhaustion-that makes me feel secure 
in the world, but what I see seems to be shrinking up, the glands are 
drying up .... All it takes is a sentence to reassure someone who is 
no longer capable of action. There must exist an assurance which is 
not of this world. (Es muste eine Versicherung geben, die nicht van dieser 
Welt ist.) 4 
The sentence is insufficient because it represents this given, static, 
immobile world, but professional academic philosophers pretend 
that the sentence is something over and above the world. Isn't it rather 
itself a part of this unsatisfying world, which doesn't give meaning 
and doesn't reassure? In fact, the sentence doesn't even mirror this 
world rigorously, since it is part of it. In the literalness of its 
abstract, institutionalized rigidity, the world is all of a piece with its 
image. In fact, if it's true that the sentence doesn't reassure, then it 
follows that it is also true that there must exist a reassurance which 
is precisely not of this world (die nicht van dieser Welt ist). We are a 
long way from the notion of a world which speaks its own sentence, but 
not from the separate notions of a world or a sentence . 
Mr. Sammler , the protagonist of Saul Bellow's Mr. Sammler's 
Planet, opposes himself to the "bad literalness" of common life, 
with both its ordinary, debilitating demands, and its "old prej-
udices." He survived one of the Nazis' mass executions, escaping 
from the ditch the Jews themselves dug, crushed on all sides by 
corpses, including his "dead wife nearby somewhere." A Pole 
named Cieslakiewicz saved him, risking his own life. But with the 
passing of years, heroism disintegrates, ends. The Polish hero falls 
into his old prejudices again, even to the point of displaying anti-
Semitic attitudes . 5 Only Samrnler fails to return to normality, con-
tinuing to torment himself. He makes an effort, he continues, 
"trying to perform some kind of symbolic task," but succeeds only 
in achieving an "unrest, exposure to trouble." In short, "Mr. 
Sammler had a symbolic character. He himself, personally, was a 
symbol. "6 But th ere's a clash between his own aspirations and the 
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difficulty of incarnating the symbol he himself or others want him 
to be. In fact, this state of abstraction is strictly tied to his loss of self, 
his diminished capacity for self-individuation. Doesn't the book 
even say that "so much of the earlier person had disappeared"? 
Mr. Sammler escaped from the Nazi death-ditch with a firm re-
solve to accomplish a symbolic task, that is, to invest his life and 
situation with meaning and value. Thus Mr. Sammler, who sees 
the resurgence of rigid old prejudices even in the Pole who saved 
his life, is a symbol, or better, an attempt at a symbol. The deeper 
truth of this situation is that the ditch of the world's horrors, which 
he had escaped, continues to threaten him . Cieslakiewicz, who 
had saved him, has returned to his anti-Semitism. The grave is still 
there, waiting to swallow him up. At least it has robbed Sammler of 
a part of himself, perhaps for life. In the wake of this mutilation, 
which has brought him from the Nazi grave to the degradation and 
violence of contemporary New York neighborhoods, Sammler 
lives out the bitter, anguished life of a symbolic man, an other, an 
alternative to ordinary life. His problem is deciding to what extent 
his life is symbolic, and thus capable of substituting expression, 
meaning, value, and creativity for mere survival, mere duration. 
"He had lasted," writes Bellow . If his entire existence had been 
taken away, his existence as a symbolic presence, or what one 
might call "his other life," there would remain only "that bad 
literalness, the yellow light of Polish summer heat. .. . Endless 
literal hours in which one is internally eaten up. Eaten because 
coherence is lacking ." 7 At the end, we are not sure whether Mr. 
Sammler has really escaped from that death-ditch after all. 
How does this all accord with professional philosophy? Do 
professional philosophers have a monopoly on the experiences of 
wonder and astonishment? Of course not, for wonder might even 
work to their detriment. More often than not nowadays, they are 
and express rather the tiredness, the literalness of the world, the 
weakness of imprisonment in the given. It might even be that this 
is the very thing that makes philosophy advance, precisely because 
it goes against that which philosophy did up to a certain point, 
within certain limits. At any rate, the point is relevant, for 
philosophy seems destined to survive only insofar as it renounces 
its tendency to model itself on specialized and professional disci-
plines such as physics, chemistry, or mathematics, and joins the 
ongoing conversation about the events and circumstances of our 
lives, exploring rare values as yet unestablished and vulnerable. 
Thus it is clearly justified to discuss even something like the 
postman's job, the problematic destiny his work might bring him. 
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Even here, as in all of life's occupations and situations, one can find 
a problematic, a wonder, an astonishment which is, as Bachman 
says, "der Anfang alles Philosophierens und der Menschwerdung"8-
"the beginning of all philosophizing and of the process of becom-
ing human." If philosophy would formally renounce passing itself 
off as a science like physics or chemistry, or as a theoretical disci-
pline with the task of providing a foundation to forms of knowl-
edge, of separating true knowledge from its pretenders, it could 
then become a kind of clarification, an illumination of our received 
cultural contexts, of traditions of thought lived out by us not just in 
the midst of but because of the haphazardness and randomness of our 
lives. But in the midst of this random haphazardness which makes 
up human lives, philosophical reflection (understood very broadly 
as conversation) is a conceptual experimentation, a sketching out 
of new alternatives to established, protected, fixed positions. 
Philosophical reflection bears fruit if it dedicates itself to tracing out 
or clarifying new contours or environments for our life, establish-
ing new and unsuspected connections in the course of its encoun-
ters or its struggle with chance and haphazardness. If literary 
narration no longer exists, for the simple reason that there is no 
world to narrate, since every world is always a world subordinate 
to a description paradigm, to a model of adopted symbolism; if 
every world is always and inevitably a version of the world, 9 then a 
literary or philosophical enterprise-we might even coin the term 
"philosophico-literary" -aims at deciphering and constructing 
meanings for the neglected realms of the random and accidental, 
following out the chain of interests, wonder, fear, and suffering. 
Naturally, chance is not a fairy-tale event, a miracle or a chimera. 
Chance should be taken seriously as part of a consciousness of the 
symbolic essence of the world. We have to take seriously the idea 
that the world is just a version of the world, in which case chance 
becomes one of its interstices, a fissure in whose framework the 
symbolic structuring of our experience is deposited and organized. 
In this sense it's true that there couldn't be abnormal discourse if 
normal discourse did not exist. 1° Chance is an escape route that leads 
out of the well-fortified symbol mill; it's the unexpected opportun-
ity that opens up in a formerly fixed version of the world. Chance 
does not resemble tripping over a stone as much as seizing new 
possibilities which exist within a certain codification of the world or 
of ordinary life; I would call the accidental, the fortuitous, an 
ethical opportunity, paradoxical as that may seem. It's a new 
ethical attitude which predisposes us to recognize chance, the 
fortuitous, giving it a value, putting it into relief, enlarging our 
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experience into a self-reckoning. Chance, ethical attitudes, 
reasons, and the capacity to create experience are all inextricably 
entwined. 
Recognizing the ethical import of chance has an implication 
equally important: the abolition of the privilege which has so far 
been accorded to professional philosophers, whom Bachman calls 
"those who reflect from their offices" (den Beamtet Reflektieren-
den). 11 For now we are able to extend to all persons who struggle 
with doubt and suffering born of their work or situation-
whatever these might be-that capacity or occasion of a 
"thought-willing-being" 12 which up to now has been considered 
the exclusive privilege of those who hold a teaching position and 
who reflect on divine existence, on Ontos on, on the origin of the 
earth, or even the origin of all things. We can now separate the 
notion of a "thought-willing-being" from that of a powerful, 
founded subject who moves among the great arches of a reflection 
which aims at consciousness as the definitive, boundless, compel-
ling possession of the whole of reality. 13 Thus freed, this notion can 
operate on everyday cases of wonder, on less-known but equally 
important occasions of reflection, doubt, suffering. Take, for 
example, a postman, Otto Kranewitzer, described by I. Bachman in 
Malina. After thirty years of careful, dutiful, meticulous service, 
suddenly he begins to stack piles and piles of unsorted mail in his 
tiny apartment. They reach from the floor to the ceiling; he even 
has to get rid of his furniture to make room for them. Naturally, he 
is fired and tried for malversation and abuse of office, since nobody 
understands why he did it. The source of his action was the pain, 
the indescribable suffering (unsiigliche Gewissenqualen), the doubt 
which he experienced working with the mail-delivering letters, 
notes, messages, and cards which caused all that risk and pain 
inherent in human communication. Bachman observes that the 
postman sees the recipients blush, tremble, go pale when he deliv-
ers their mail. He intuits, suspects, he must know something (er 
ahnt etwas, er muss etwas wissen). Postman Otto Kranewitzer, com-
ments Bachman, was misunderstood; they didn't realize that "he 
was driven to reflection, struck with wonder," that wonder which, 
as it has been said, is the origin of philosophy and of becoming 
human. 14 
We must observe two things: the first is that the postman's 
wonder and reflection confounds professional philosophy, com-
mitted as it is to categorizing everything there is as part of the 
"objective world," or the fixed categories of Being. The second is 
that the postman senses the doubt, wonder, and suffering of mail 
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circulation without, of course, reading the letters. So it's not just 
that he invades the domain of wonder and reflection formerly 
monopolized by professional, specialized, official thought, but he 
does so utilizing an approach which differs profoundly from that of 
the "Beamtet Reflektierenden," those who reflect from their offices. 
This new possibility constitutes chance, its accidental character 
with respect to the postman's ordinary perceptions, his letteralness, 
if I may be permitted a play on words. In postman Kranewitzer's 
case, unlike that of "ordinary men," this means a letter is not just a 
letter, and a stamp not just a stamp. Because of this, he creates an 
actual crisis with the mail. But his wonder, his reflection, and his 
suffering with respect to his mission, spring from his new ap-
proach to the mail. His problem, his wonder, his suffering, and his 
final crisis are triggered by the circulation of messages, the mate-
rials he carries around, the web of reactions and attitudes of the 
recipients, what he knows or suspects about them. This new aspect 
of his attitude, which he deepens, marks out an original horizon of 
experience and meaning. What counts is not the content of the 
letters or messages, but a new drama-the interaction of the bearer 
and receivers of the mail-a real-life scene which substitutes its 
meaning for the previous one. Before this postman perceived mail 
circulation in this particular way, these ethical contours, this in-
terpretation of pain, wonder, doubt, and suffering which he 
enacted had never existed, having been excluded from ordinary, 
literal discourse. 
The transition to this new vision creates a new paradigm of 
objects in the world, a new chain of details and traces which we can 
use to appropriate human existence. Bachman writes that for the 
postman 
our streets were completely familiar; he knew exactly which letters, 
which stamps, which packages were correctly cancelled. Even so 
much as a slight difference in address-a name preceded by "Illus-
trious," a name with no "Mr." or "Mrs." attached, a "Prof. Dr."-
told him more about people's attitudes, about generational conflict, 
about the signs of social upheaval, than our sociologists or psychia-
trists ever succeed in finding out. 15 
We can never stop learning useful things from the case of this 
postman. In fact, we haven't just passed from one vision to 
another, from an ordinary to an extraordinary one, imbued with 
new traces, details, and unexpected chance opportunities. Passing 
from the one to the other in this voyage of discovery, we have gone 
from a state of grounded, protected erudition to a weak knowl-
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edge, a fragmentary state of marginal, external contingency. But 
this perception is fully aware of two circumstances: one is that the 
first version or paradigm of our life is that which we were taught, 
which was transmitted to us, and as such received the stigmata of a 
powerful legitimation and popularity; the other is that this new 
paradigm or version of the world does not just mechanically substi-
tute its own symbolic and conceptual arsenal for the old one. It is a 
painful, laborious reinterpretation of the first, already interpreted 
world, of human life. Thus there is an active interchange between the 
new, less popular, unestablished values and the older, established 
and protected ones, between ordinary and extraordinary dis-
course. The new interpretation has, so to speak, suffused the prior 
symbolic system with its disquieting breeze, breathing a new con-
tingency, exposing prior limitations, superimposing its new, seem-
ingly unimaginable possibilities, disseminating an ignorance 
which is all of a piece with it. The old world is thus weakened, 
made fragile. World history, too, follows this course; human lan-
guage reworks itself, shines upon itself from behind, pitilessly 
reinterpreting its own achievements, repositioning itself, but also 
transforming the immense, omnipresent present into the image of a 
past, thus producing the enigma of Time and its History. 
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